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 1. Introduction 
 In their path to consolidation, developing democracies strive to ensure the demo-
cratic transfer of political power, gain legitimacy with elites and civil society, reform 
and restructure their legal systems and economy, and, maybe most importantly, 
develop democratic civil-military relations (CMR)—that is establishing new secu-
rity institutions (to include intelligence agencies) that are under democratic civilian 
control, and are effective and effi cient ( Bruneau and Boraz  2007 , 1–24). 1 Of these 
many tasks, the democratization of intelligence agencies is by far the most challeng-
ing, as effectiveness and effi ciency call for secrecy, while democratic control involves 
transparency, openness, and accountability. Some scholars say that “democracy and 
secrecy are incompatible” even in long-established democracies ( Holt  1995 , 1). One 
 1  Bruneau and Boraz study intelligence as a subset of CMR, conceptualized as a trinity—
democratic civilian control, effectiveness in achieving roles and missions, and effi ciency. 
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can legitimately question if democratization of the intelligence agencies is an impos-
sible target for developing democracies, specifi cally considering the repressive 
activities of the previous non-democratic intelligence agencies? Are there any 
 formulas for success to the many challenges? Where do they come from—the past, 
the intelligence agencies in the so-called intelligence community (IC) themselves, 
those outside the IC (domestic and foreign), or all of the above? 
 This chapter discusses the “quest” for transparency and effectiveness of the 
intelligence systems in the developing democracies. 2 It fi rst reviews the literature on 
intelligence reform in new democracies, followed by the role of intelligence in non-
democratic regimes, legacies from these regimes in transitional democracies, and 
the challenges involved as well as achievements in reforming intelligence in the 
developing democracies. 
 2. Review of the Relevant Literature on 
Intelligence and Democratic Consolidation 
 While the literature on intelligence is replete with studies on the reform of intelli-
gence in the established democracies (such as the United States, United Kingdom, 
and Israel), there is much less on how the developing democracies tackle intelli-
gence reform after the demise of the non-democratic regimes. This is due to many 
reasons, but probably most important is that in some newer democracies intelli-
gence still remains a “taboo” subject, which limits researchers’ and scholars’ access 
to information, and an “intelligence literature” is yet to be accepted as valid in the 
academic environment. 
 Despite these challenges, a few prominent scholars and respectable regional and 
international institutions have researched and published on intelligence reform in the 
developing democracies. The Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (DCAF), The RAND Corporation, the Center for Civil-Military Relations 
(CCMR),  Studies in Intelligence, Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence , and 
 Intelligence and National Security Journal contribute a variety of valuable materials on 
the topic. 3 Virtual libraries and databases like the Federation of American Scientists 
( www.fas.org ) are as well tremendous sources for information and research in the 
realm of intelligence and democracy. 
 2  Due to the peculiar characteristics of intelligence (including the secrecy that inevitably 
envelops intelligence activities and budgets, and prevents us from ensuring a credible cost-benefi t 
analysis), our analysis will not include effi ciency; thus, it will be limited to two of the afore-
 mentioned parameters of the CMR trinity—control and effectiveness. 
 3  Additionally, not only do CCMR and DCAF publish articles and books on intelligence and 
democratization, but they also focus their efforts toward assisting the emerging democracies to 
revamp their intelligence apparatuses, through various seminars and courses. 
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 Virtually all of the literature on intelligence in the newer democracies focuses 
on how to achieve control and transparency. This is a natural concern of all devel-
oping democracies due to what the intelligence apparatuses did in the non- 
democratic regimes, but there is much more involved in the security-democracy 
equation: effectiveness (and effi ciency). This chapter aims to fi ll in the gap in the 
literature, in that it looks at intelligence reform in the developing democracies from 
both the control and effectiveness dimensions. 
 3. Intelligence and the 
Non-Democratic Regimes 
 Admittedly, nondemocratic regimes (in all their forms—authoritarian, totalitarian, 
etc.), create and use intelligence agencies to ensure the “survival” of the regime. 
As distinguished scholar Michael Warner skillfully puts it, non-democratic regimes 
“feel themselves beset by enemies from rival classes, races, or creeds, and they build 
‘counterintelligence states’ . . . to defend themselves from wreckers, saboteurs,  kulaks , 
or non-Aryans” (Warner 2008). They use their intelligence apparatuses (known as 
“political polices”) to control, intimidate, manipulate, abuse, and oppress real and/or 
imaginary “ideological enemies,” both domestically and abroad, with no respect for 
human rights and liberties, and without being democratically accountable to the 
people, but rather to a few political leaders. Examples include Romania’s Securitate, 
Germany’s Stasi, Czechoslovakia’s StB, Russia’s KGB, Chile’s DINA, Brazil’s SNI and 
ABIN, and so forth. With time, as the regimes tend to increasingly rely on the intel-
ligence agencies, their power and size heighten, and they shift from “political polices” 
to “independent security states.” Independent security states gain incremental auton-
omy from the regime and insulation from any scrutiny. Such intelligence apparatuses 
existed in Brazil (SNI), Iran (SAVAK), Chile (DINA), and South Africa (BOSS). 
 4. Intelligence and the Developing 
Democracies 
 4.1  The Legacies of the Non-Democratic Regimes: 
Challenges to Intelligence Reform 
 Since the beginning of the “third wave” of democratization with the 1974 Revolution 
in Portugal, there has been a boom of democracy throughout the globe. A great 
many non-democratic regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa  underwent 
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fundamental changes (either through peaceful or bloody revolutions), aspiring to 
become consolidated democracies ( Bruneau and Boraz  2007 , 1–24). They held free 
and fair elections, instituted market economies, and fostered the creation of civil 
societies. But while the economic, political, and societal “indices” of democratiza-
tion may be “high” in a certain country, it cannot be considered a “consolidated 
democracy” until having thoroughly overhauled their intelligence apparatuses, 
from repressive and uncontrolled state security systems into democratic communi-
ties, both effective and transparent. This, however, is easier said than done, because 
the “new” intelligence systems always come with a “package.” 
 First, intelligence agencies carry a “stigma” of their non-democratic past and 
transgressions, which linger for decades in peoples’ hearts and minds. As in most 
cases the new services are built on the ruins of the former, non-democratic intelli-
gence agencies (preserving the personnel, premises, and other assets of the non-
democratic institutions), this triggers the populace’s disdain and mistrust. As Larry 
Watts states in a regional study on Eastern Europe, “transition populations tend to 
favor the destruction of intelligence apparatuses, not their reform” ( Watts  2004 ). 
Older democracies, too, lack trust in the emerging democracies’ intelligence, which 
negatively impacts foreign assistance to intelligence reform and cooperation. 
Suspicion is further fueled by what Williams and Deletant call “the culture of gull-
ible cynicism” inherited from the non-democratic regimes—a form of negative 
campaigning (via rumors, disinformation, and planted articles reinforced by the 
new competitive politics), aimed at preserving the image of the state as an erratic 
and unruly body ( Williams and Deletant  2000 , 16–20). 
 Second, intelligence agencies lack professionalism—expertise, responsibility 
and corporateness via formal and structured personnel routines and traditions, 
through strict entrance requirements, continuous professionalization programs, a 
code of ethics specifi c to each organization, professional associations, as well as 
mechanisms enabling cumulative learning and improvement ( Marrin and Clemente 
 2006 , 644). Developing democracies lack of all these. To begin with, hiring new 
personnel is rather diffi cult, considering the population’s loathing of the intelli-
gence agencies. In the attempt to deal with the staffi ng issue, emerging democracies 
tend to preserve the intelligence personnel of the non-democratic regimes (now 
“true supporters” of democracy). Yet, since “old habits die hard” there is always the 
risk for these personnel to operate as in the past, limit employment possibilities for 
a new generation of intelligence experts, and/or convey their “best practices” to the 
new personnel. As Williams and Deletant note when talking about post-communist 
intelligence agencies in Europe, “if there is continuity with the pre-1989 corporate 
culture, it may be as harmful as it is integrative” ( Williams and Deletant  2000 , 
16–20). Professionalization of intelligence in the developing democracies appears, 
therefore, to be a vicious cycle. 
 Third, the transition governments have little (or no) experience on how to 
undertake intelligence reform. While old democracies have the luxury of time and 
availability of research materials to build such expertise, emerging democracies are 
orphaned in these resources. And, whatever reform pattern the old democracies 
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 followed are generally neither suitable nor alluring to the new democracies to “bor-
row.” In addition, reform of the intelligence agencies in the emerging democracies 
is only a part of a comprehensive transformation of the state and government insti-
tutions. Governments tend to be more focused on economic and political reform 
than security, which leads to perfunctory intelligence reform initiatives, through 
meager resource allocation and precarious management. 
 Fourth, in some non-democratic regimes intelligence was a monopoly of the 
military (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Honduras, and Spain). Military intelligence still 
enjoys autonomy and has considerable power even in these newer democracies. 
 Further challenges arise from inadequate legislation, hasty retirement and/or 
fi ring of the old intelligence personnel, corruption and even penetration by orga-
nized crime groups and cartels of security agencies, of which the newly created 
intelligence agencies take advantage, to carry on their obscure practices and resist 
democratic control and transparency. 
 4.2  Transforming Intelligence: Reaching Transparency 
and Effectiveness 
 Considering all the aforementioned challenges, some obvious questions are raised. 
How do developing democracies professionalize their intelligence agencies and 
make them effective and transparent? How do they manage to break the wall of 
“distrust” between the citizens and intelligence agencies? How can they make the 
people understand that intelligence is “needed” and how can they trust that the IC 
no longer works against them? 
 From our research, we have learned that, if there is willingness to change, and/
or a strong external drive, revamping intelligence can be successful. Many emerging 
democracies fought the legacies of the non-democratic regimes and reached a bal-
ance between secrecy and transparency. Essentially, the reform followed two paths: 
one drawn by democratic consolidation and the other drawn by the contemporary 
security environment. Reform, thus, fi rst focused on making intelligence account-
able, more open and transparent. It encompassed creating new intelligence systems, 
establishing new legal frameworks for them, and, most importantly, bringing them 
under democratic control. Reform did not attach much importance to the effective-
ness (or effi ciency) of the IC, because, as previously mentioned, the lack of account-
ability rather than effectiveness was the problem during the non-democratic 
regimes. Nevertheless, the advent of the less predictable security threats (to include 
terrorism in all its forms, organized crime, etc.) changed the reform focus, from 
asserting and maintaining control, to effective fulfi llment of roles and missions, and 
cooperation with domestic and foreign counterparts, which increasingly empha-
sized intelligence effectiveness. 
 Eastern European countries had an additional spur for the intelligence reform, 
which prompted them far ahead of their confreres from Latin America or Africa: 
the prospect of NATO and EU membership (a status desired as a formal “ attestation” 
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 4  Some of the units continued to exist, as effective intelligence collection was a priority due to 
the perception of various threats. 
of their democratic consolidation and enhanced security capabilities), coupled with 
the two organizations’ membership requirements and incentives. The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization is a collective defense and security organization while the EU, 
although it focuses primarily on economic and development cooperation, also pro-
motes security reform within the framework of its European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP). After 1989, the two institutions focused on advancing peace and 
stability to Eastern Europe by opening their doors to new members and equally 
assisting aspirant and non-candidate countries to consolidate their democracies 
and increase their security capabilities. Their various assistance programs, partner-
ships, and/or membership requirements, galvanized the region’s security reform 
process in general and intelligence in particular. 
 Not all emerging democracies, however, succeeded in “revolutionizing” their 
intelligence agencies to make them both transparent and effective, in some cases, 
because the countries themselves failed to become democratic (Russia), or because 
intelligence remained embedded within the armed forces, which maintain their 
own intelligence activities and lack civilian oversight and transparency (Russia and 
Indonesia;  Tsypkin  2007 , 268–300;  Conboy  2004 , 15–248). 
 4.2.1  Creating New Intelligence Agencies: Reforming Organizations 
and Personnel 
 When undertaking reform of the intelligence structure, some emerging democra-
cies decided to preserve their monolithic intelligence apparatuses inherited from 
the non-democratic regimes (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland). 
Others divided them into multiple agencies (for example, either a few civilian, 
police, border guard, military, foreign, and domestic agencies, or all), to avoid the 
monopolization of power by one single agency as in the past, foster competition 
and cooperation, and strengthen democratic control (Romania, South Africa and 
Brazil). In either case, the countries opted to retain former non-democratic person-
nel in the new structures, which affl icted the intelligence agencies’ reputation, no 
matter the reasons for said continuity. 4 The personnel’s deeply entrenched paro-
chial views, involvement in corruption and organized crime activities, as well as 
recurring politicization, “metastasized” the democratization of the intelligence for 
years. Countries had, therefore, to subsequently undertake tedious downsizing and 
vetting processes of their intelligence agencies, paralleled by new personnel recruit-
ment and professionalization procedures, which will be addressed below. 
 Some countries that had fortuitous geographic surroundings and/or enjoyed 
outside security guarantees opted to completely overhaul the agencies and remove 
all personnel from the past (Czechoslovakia), even with the price of losing the agen-
cies’ intelligence capabilities for quite a few years ( Watts  2004 ). Conversely, coun-
tries located in confl ict regions and/or without security guarantees from outside, 
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could not afford such a drastic reform. Weeding out all intelligence personnel from 
the past would have undoubtedly crippled the ability of their intelligence agencies 
to ensure the security of their countries, which would, perhaps, trigger the spread-
ing out of insecurity to their territories. They rather embarked on incremental 
downsizing of the legacy personnel (Bulgaria, Romania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Albania). In parallel, some new democracies undertook formal vetting (lustration) 
processes to cleanse the new services of the personnel compromised either by their 
actual contribution to repressive activities or by their membership in specifi c divi-
sions of the past repressive intelligence agencies (Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Peru). In Eastern Europe, a particular case of the overall vetting process was the 
screening of the offi cials who would work with NATO-classifi ed information. This 
proved very effective mainly because the state authorities vested to conduct the 
background checks established close relationships with NATO (through coordina-
tion and direct monitoring by NATO), and followed the alliance’s effective proce-
dures and criteria ( Matei  2007 a ;  Matei  2007 b , 629–60;  Watts  2004 ). 
 While purging the former non-democratic intelligence personnel was without 
any doubt indispensable for the transformation of intelligence, it had unexpected 
outcomes, which affected its effectiveness. The purged personnel were often rehired 
by other institutions, with no vetting requirements (which allowed them to con-
tinue their practices in the new institutions), opened their own private businesses 
(thus competing with the state agencies, as they had greater resources to procure 
modern equipment), or became involved in serious corruption and organized crime 
activities. And, no matter how many former personnel were removed, a certain 
number still continued to function in the new agencies. Moreover, many fi les “dis-
appeared” during or after the transitions, which made impossible the carrying out 
of a proper background check; the screening process was routinely manipulated by 
the old personnel, while the legitimacy of those carrying out the vetting was doubt-
ful (they had not been subjected to any prior screening;  Matei  2007 a ;  Matei  2007 b , 
629–60;  Watts  2004 ). 
 To compensate for the “loss” of the legacy personnel, some developing democ-
racies opened the doors of their intelligence services to younger generations 
(Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Hungary, and Brazil). They established explicit 
admission requirements and personnel management policies, in line with the agen-
cies’ specifi c roles and missions and personnel criteria. Professionalization oppor-
tunities, continuous education and training, promotion systems based on merit 
and performance, a team-oriented work environment, and attractive benefi t pack-
ages brought in bright, open-minded graduates from universities or representatives 
of civil societies, with no involvement with the past intelligence and faultless con-
duct. As Shlomo Sphiro notes, old-fashioned “[d]ark and dusty corridors, lined 
with wooden fi ling cabinets, softly spoken Russian, and dashing case offi cers” were 
“quickly replaced by computer whiz kids, ambitious junior management and staff 
often more concerned with pension benefi ts . . .” ( Gill  2008 , 651–54). 
 The revamping of the intelligence organizations and personnel was not thor-
oughgoing and/or transparent in all countries. In Brazil, a good number of former 
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SNI personnel are still powerful. According to  Jane’s Intelligence Digest , SNI person-
nel’s integration into ABIN and their new career path remain unclear; the SNI’s 
heirs remain a infl uential independent cluster within the agency, engaging in all 
sorts of illicit operations (for example, illegal phone tapping), and insulated from 
the management’s scrutiny ( Jane’s Intelligence Digest 2008 ). Similar incidents occur 
periodically in Argentina, Colombia, and Peru, at a minimum in Latin America. 
Admittedly, a reliable screening of the old personnel is still desired, in particular in 
those countries that did not have outside incentives and support. 
 4.2.2 Establishing Legal Frameworks for Intelligence 
 As noted above, the intelligence apparatuses were central to the non-democratic 
regimes, routinely infringing upon human rights and liberties. Establishing a com-
pletely new legal framework for intelligence, which pledges that the new intelligence 
systems serve the security interests of their nations and citizens versus a privileged 
class, is hence cardinal in the emerging democracies. It should clearly defi ne the 
responsibilities and powers of the intelligence agencies as well as the types and 
mechanisms of control and oversight, including: delineating what the intelligence 
agencies can and cannot do, who is in charge of the intelligence, and who controls 
and oversees its activities, personnel, and funding; stipulating the circumstances for 
interagency coordination and/or international cooperation; and ensuring the intel-
ligence personnel are responsible before the law in case of abuses, and/or benefi t 
from legal protection if they observe the legally-agreed-upon guidance and direc-
tions. Furthermore, to reach an optimal balance between effectiveness and trans-
parency, emerging democracies need to enact legislation that allows citizens and 
civil-society representatives to access government information. This is particularly 
important when countries attempt to “over-classify” every piece of government 
information, in the attempt to arbitrarily limit the public’s access to information, 
disregarding democratic norms. 
 By and large, numerous emerging democracies have gradually developed legal 
frameworks for their newly created intelligence agencies. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Romania, and South Africa now have robust legal frameworks, stipulating new 
mandates for intelligence, control, oversight, accountability, and transparency. 
As unprecedented events unfolded (such as the terrorist attacks in the United States 
on September 11, 2001), which had a devastating impact on national, regional, and 
global security, countries adjusted their legal frameworks on intelligence and secu-
rity, to enhance the intelligence effectiveness in combating asymmetrical threats 
(to include terrorism). That is, to increase powers of the ICs, foster interagency 
coordination and enable international cooperation. Yet, even in the countries that 
have a robust legal framework, some gaps in the legislation are permissive to intel-
ligence misconduct and violation of human rights and liberties for political reasons 
and/or personal vendettas versus national security purposes (Romania, Brazil). 
As Peter Gill states, “new laws may provide a veneer of legality and accountability 
behind which essentially unreconstructed practices continue to the detriment of 
human rights and freedoms ( Gill  2008 , 5–7). 
0001108228.INDD   764 9/22/2009   9:22:59 PM
intelligence in the developing democracies 765
 4.2.3 Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence 
 Placing intelligence under democratic civilian control became a key focus of both 
the democratically elected civilians and civil-society representatives in most of the 
emerging democracies, as well as scholars in the established democracies, and col-
lective security organizations’ membership requirements. Control is needed to 
ensure intelligence agencies work within specifi c limits and respect the legal frame-
work imposed upon them. With the increased emphasis on augmenting intelligence 
agencies’ abilities to better fi ght the current security challenges, there is even more 
need for robust democratic control mechanisms in place to make sure the ICs do 
not use national security and terrorism prevention as excuses to become intrusive 
in citizens’ private lives. And, fi nally, democratic control is needed to boost the 
effectiveness of the intelligence forces. 
 Intelligence control (consisting of direction and oversight) is ensured by the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government, internal arrange-
ments of the intelligence agencies themselves, or external mechanisms (at both 
domestic and international levels). Executive control usually sets forth the intelli-
gence priorities and directives, roles and missions, as well as basic structures and 
organization. Responsible bodies may include ministries of defense, directors of 
intelligence communities, national security councils, and/or other means of inter-
agency coordination. Legislative control (also known as congressional or parlia-
mentary control and oversight) acts as a balance to the executive control, and 
generally encompasses the establishment of the legal framework for intelligence, as 
well as control and review of the intelligence’s activities, budgets, and personnel. 
Responsible bodies are in general standing or ad hoc committees within the legisla-
tures, and their staff. The committees enact legislation, review budgetary and staff-
ing decisions, vet nominees, and open inquiries regarding abuses or other intelligence 
problems. Additional independent institutions may function in support of the par-
liaments to assist with budget reviews and/or protect citizens’ rights against intelli-
gence intrusion (for example, courts of audits, offi ces of the advocate of the people, 
or ombudsmen). Judicial review ensures the agencies use their special powers 
according to the law, and protects citizens’ rights from the agencies’ intrusive collec-
tion and searches. Responsible bodies in general include courts of justice. Internal 
control consists of legal-accountability mechanisms functioning within intelligence 
organizations themselves (for example, counsels, inspectors general [IGs], as well as 
agencies’ intrinsic professional codes of ethics and institutional norms). External 
control consists of the review of the intelligence organizations by “outsiders” (free 
press, independent lobbies and think tanks, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and international organizations). 
 Whether an act of free will, or imposed by outside, most developing democra-
cies shaped (at least on paper) various formal tools for controlling the activity of 
intelligence agencies (Argentina, Brazil, Romania, and South Africa); they created 
national security councils, committees in the parliament, IGs, courts and ombuds-
man offi ces, appointed civilians in command positions within military intelligence 
establishments, and the like. In some countries, the nascent and spirited civil 
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 societies and media waged an “informal” oversight campaign, which complemented 
the existing formal mechanisms (Argentina, Guatemala, Romania). Yet a series of 
obstacles hindered the effectiveness of the democratic control and oversight of the 
intelligence in virtually all developing democracies. First was the intelligence agen-
cies’ resistance to any form of scrutiny, due to insuffi cient trust in the “amateurs” 
who controlled them, doubt that the politicians considered national security a pri-
ority, and belief that more freedom from any oversight constraint would increase 
their effectiveness in safeguarding national security. This is even more problematic 
in those countries that have mostly military intelligence, which opposed any form 
of control and oversight from civilian authorities and thus continue to enjoy high 
autonomy. Second was the insuffi cient time for state institutions to mature and 
become legitimate; during the fi rst transition years, governments were repeatedly 
contested and in many cases impeached, and therefore, had little time to build legit-
imacy to be able to institute control. Nor did they make intelligence reform and 
control a top priority. Moreover, the institutions of control and oversight resisted as 
much as possible the task to scrutinize intelligence activities, mainly because they 
did not want to be associated with the “stigmatic” intelligence agencies, preferred to 
be able to deny knowledge of operations (avoid looking as if they disregarded any 
illegal activities), lacked suffi cient knowledge of security and intelligence matters to 
be able to have an informed opinion, and had modest or no political incentives to 
render such work. Third, corruption, favoritism, nepotism, and blackmail (includ-
ing blackmail with the fi les kept by the non-democratic regimes)—common lega-
cies of the authoritarian regimes for all developing democracies—were also 
impediments to democratic control. Fourth, with regard to external control, chal-
lenges derived from limited or nonexistent access to government information, leaks 
to civil societies and the media, and the media’s propensity to sensationalism versus 
objective coverage ( Boraz and Bruneau  2006 , 28–42). 
 In order to improve their democratic control capabilities, some developing 
democracies embarked upon more serious reforming and advanced democratic 
control, aiming at raising public interest on intelligence and security matters, 
increasing civilian awareness and competence in the fi eld of security and intelli-
gence, institutionalizing processes that support transparency and effectiveness, fos-
tering a political culture that supports and trusts intelligence in society and inside 
the IC, as well as professionalizing the intelligence services ( Boraz and Bruneau 
 2006 , 28–42). 
 To raise public interest, countries stimulated regular informed public debates 
and meetings on security and intelligence matters. In Argentina and Brazil, for 
example, politicians regularly discuss the need for civilian control and other intelli-
gence-related matters ( Boraz and Bruneau  2006 , 28–42). In Colombia, as well, with 
the continuing violence and greater understanding of the key role of intelligence in 
ensuring national security, representatives of the government, NGOs, the press, aca-
demia, and even the populace are debating intelligence issues (even though few are 
well-enough informed to provide rigorous control of the intelligence apparatus); 
this generated a nascent literature on intelligence and security in Colombia (from 
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roles and missions to control and effectiveness), as well as strengthened the popula-
tion’s trust and support for intelligence and security forces ( Boraz  2008 , 141). 
Furthermore, NGOs and the media have spawned regular debate via exposing intel-
ligence scandals and failures to the public. In Romania, the media have played a 
crucial role in promoting democratic control of intelligence. 
 Efforts were devoted to increase intelligence outsiders’ awareness and compe-
tence in intelligence. This happened in South Africa, due to political and institu-
tional bargains made during processes of democratic transition ( Boraz and Bruneau 
 2006 , 28–42). In Romania, it happened after numerous media scandals, due to 
NATO/EU integration requirements, and following September 11, 2001 ( Matei 
 2007 a ;  Matei  2007 b , 629–60;  Matei  2007 c , 219–40). Countries opened up their intel-
ligence training schools to civilians who might one day become involved in the 
oversight process. The Romanian IC took this one step further in that some agen-
cies have allowed citizens, not necessarily involved with national security, to study 
in their education facilities, without any constraint to work for the IC or in the 
oversight committees ( Matei  2007 d , 1–20). Besides, international cooperative train-
ing arrangements, the media, and open source available materials have also helped 
civilians learn about intelligence. Taken together, these endeavors have enabled 
decision-makers to make better and informed decisions on national security and 
intelligence issues, improved transparency and democratic control, raised mutual 
respect between ICs and outsiders, and deepened coordination and cooperation. 
 To increase transparency and effectiveness, in some countries civilians took a 
keener role in reviewing and updating national security and intelligence documents, 
budgets, and activities (increased access to intelligence [security clearances], regular 
hearings etc), as well as fostering interagency coordination and cooperation. 
Romania provides a good example of how democratic control can improve the 
effectiveness of the intelligence agencies; it has progressively developed robust 
 executive and legislative mechanisms to bring the IC under democratic control, 
which: reduced the exaggerated number of agencies (there were at least nine in the 
2000s); defi ned clearer roles and missions for the agencies; enforced coordination 
and cooperation among them and with other security institutions; conducted 
inquiries and hearings; and vetted and fi red intelligence directors and personnel. In 
particular, to ease access to intelligence, the parliament enacted a law which allows 
parliamentarians and other government offi cials access intelligence without secu-
rity clearance (which worries IC members with regard to leaks), as well as a leak 
prevention law to protect intelligence secrecy ( Matei  2007 b ;  Bruneau and Matei 
 2008 , 909–29). Colombia is also a good example. President Alvaro Uribe in 2002 
took strong personal control over the intelligence and other security institutions to 
strengthen the agencies’ effectiveness in fi ghting the high internal threat posed by 
FARC, AUC, ELN, and individual drug traffi ckers. His direct involvement not only 
increased national security, but also the legitimacy of the government as it handled 
security matters sensibly (with President Uribe being reelected in 2006;  Boraz  2008 , 
130–45). These have not only strengthened legitimacy of the government, but also 
increased the IC effectiveness. 
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 In Brazil, the wiretapping scandal in late 2008 may provide an opportunity for 
the government to step in and further overhaul ABIN and other intelligence agen-
cies (for example,for example clearer roles and missions and personnel vetting), 
which will perhaps improve ABIN’s credibility, on the one hand, and strengthen its 
effectiveness and professionalism, on the other hand. 
 Of particular importance has been the professionalization of the intelligence 
agencies (expertise, corporateness, and responsibility), which the developing 
democracies have strived to accomplish through various education and training 
programs for intelligence personnel, security clearances to access to classifi ed infor-
mation, as well as instilling a responsibility for democracy (Argentina, Brazil, 
Romania, and South Africa). 
 All these efforts have helped several developing democracies foster a political 
culture that supports and trusts intelligence in society and inside the IC. Yet not all 
developing democracies have public awareness of the need for democratic civilian 
authorities to advance democratic control and oversight of the IC. In Russia and 
Moldova, for example, democratic control of the intelligence agencies is either non-
existent or undeveloped ( Boraz and Bruneau  2006 , 28–42). In Spain, the intelligence 
reform has not gone far enough since the country’s transition to democracy, even if 
the end of the Cold War, dangerous security environment due to terrorism, and 
involvement of the intelligence agencies in numerous scandals call for IC transfor-
mation ( Gimenez-Salinas  2003 , 78–79). 
 4.2.4 Reaching Effectiveness in Fulfi lling Roles and Missions 
 When working out the ineluctable “security versus democracy” quandary that ham-
pers intelligence reform, the developing democracies need to undertake more than 
creating new intelligence agencies, and bringing them under legal bases and demo-
cratic civilian control. Channeling unremitting efforts towards intelligence effec-
tiveness is, too, important. The bottom line is intelligence safeguards national 
security, and, today, when international terrorism, drug traffi cking, money launder-
ing, and organized crime are the main security threats for most countries, intelli-
gence effectiveness is vital. 
 To be effective, intelligence agencies need to: follow elaborate plans or strategies 
(for example, national security strategies, or intelligence doctrines) developed by 
competent entities (for example, national security councils, directors of intelligence 
or specifi c interagency coordination bodies); and receive suffi cient resources (for 
example, political capital, money, and personnel) to enable them implement the 
assigned roles and missions as best possible ( Bruneau and Matei  2008 , 909–29). 
Effectiveness also involves coordination and cooperation among agencies (to 
include intelligence and information sharing, common databases, networking, and 
mergers). 
 As noted before, newer democracies initially paid little attention to effective-
ness of the intelligence agencies, partly because of the intelligence agencies’ role in 
the non-democratic past, and the authorities’ reduced awareness of the need for 
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and role of the intelligence in safeguarding the national security. Brazil and Colombia 
are great examples in this sense. In Brazil, administrations did not consider effec-
tiveness a priority in the overall intelligence reform until the gang threat emerged 
dramatically in 2006 in the major cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, and the 
Pan-American Games were about to commence in 2007. In Colombia, on the other 
hand, effectiveness became important only following major scandals exposed by the 
media and the emerging internal confl icts ( Bruneau  2007 a ;  Bruneau  2007 b ). 
 Establishing cooperation and coordination mechanisms was also challenging, 
due to political infi ghting, competitive agencies (for political versus effectiveness 
reasons), deeply ingrained bureaucratic routines and mentalities, and tepid atti-
tudes toward sharing. In Romania, bringing all the intelligence agencies under the 
umbrella of a “community” was delayed for years due to the above-mentioned chal-
lenges, as well as the public’s fear of a “return of the Securitate,” if the agencies unite 
under one roof, and especially if Securitate personnel still work in the intelligence 
agencies. 
 At the international level, cooperation was even more diffi cult, due to enduring 
Cold War mindsets, suspicion, and mistrust. In Argentina, in spite of the Secretariat 
of Intelligence’s (SI’s) good start on international cooperation to avert and counter 
Islamic terrorism (especially with the United States intelligence agencies), the 
agency lost its credibility due to involvement with Russian mafi a and former KGB 
agents ( Antunes  2008 , 109). In Europe, old democracies refused to believe in the 
“transformation” of the newer democracies’ intelligence apparatuses and feared 
that cooperation would entail leaks or passages of classifi ed information to 
“unfriendly” third parties. For example, NATO countries worried that if former 
satellites of the USSR became full NATO members, they would pass the Alliance’s 
classifi ed information to Russia. Indeed, some countries continued to rely on the 
Soviet Union for expertise for many years after the end of communism: their ICs 
either remained under KGB mandate until the collapse of the Soviet Union, or 
maintained close relationships with Moscow (including common training with 
Russian intelligence;  Watts  2004 ). Therefore, in return for membership, NATO 
demanded the aspirant countries remove and replace all personnel who had for-
merly been involved in human rights abuses or operations against the Alliance, as 
well as with doubtful behavior. This had yet another negative effect on cooperation. 
Various “benevolent” infl uence groups, interested in minimizing intelligence effec-
tiveness, used propaganda to say that NATO wanted all old personnel out in order 
to weaken the agencies, which was not the case; NATO countries knew a complete 
removal would seriously have affected Human Intelligence (HUMINT) coopera-
tion with the developing democracies (especially in tackling terrorism and orga-
nized crime), whose ICs had great HUMINT capabilities ( Watts  2004 ). 
 Then again, the immediacy and multifaceted nature of terrorism and other 
asymmetrical threats called for changing the intelligence agencies from rigid 
bureaucracies to fl exible and well-designed institutions, staffed with creative intel-
ligence professionals. After the tragic terrorist attacks in the United States (2001), 
Spain (2004), the United Kingdom (2005), and elsewhere, effective intelligence 
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became top priority in many countries (both old and new democracies). Decision 
makers focused on increasing intelligence budgets and resources (personnel, equip-
ment, education, training) changing doctrines, regulations, and other norms of 
intelligence, as well as improving interagency cooperation and coordination. 
 To strengthen coordination and cooperation at the national level, virtually all 
newer democracies adopted/improved anti-terrorism legislation, created clearer 
roles and missions for their agencies, improved recruitment standards, education 
and training (relying on foreign assistance provided by older democracies), and 
established specifi c mechanisms to enable information sharing (for example, offi ces 
of integrated analysis or interagency centers for combating terrorism and organized 
crime). Moreover, in some countries, the agencies opened more to the society 
(through partnership and public-relations campaigns) in order to both make the 
public aware of the threats and need for intelligence as well as to ensure future 
recruits. Romania has been very involved in educating the public on security mat-
ters, besides ensuring education of the civilians that oversee IC activity, as has been 
presented above. The Romanian Domestic Intelligence Service (SRI), which is the 
country’s main institution in combating and preventing terrorism, travels habitu-
ally throughout the country to inform students, academia, and others on the 
national security threats, as well as on the Romanian IC capabilities to counter 
national security threats. Whenever possible, the IC also involves the civil society in 
meetings and discussions, as well as practical exercises on combating terrorism and 
organized crime ( Matei  2007 a ;  Matei  2007 b , 629–60;  Matei  2007 c , 219–40). 
 At the international level, countries strengthened cooperation (bilateral, trilat-
eral, regional, global) and intelligence sharing, even if secrecy and national interests 
continue to prevail when undertaking cooperation. In Latin America bilateral coop-
eration is generally considered good with most, if not all, countries. In Europe, 
again, NATO and EU are credited with strengthening of intelligence cooperation of 
the former Eastern European communist countries, through the requirements 
imposed by the EU’s  Acquis Communautaire and NATO’s membership action plan 
(MAP), as well as the expertise and assistance provided by the two organizations. 
To a greater or lesser degree, regional cooperation became a prerequisite for 
 membership ( Matei  2008 , 37–57). On the other hand, the global war on terrorism, 
which brought nations together in combat (including intelligence), has as well 
increased cooperation among partners and allies and thus advanced intelligence 
effectiveness. 
 5. Conclusion 
 Having an intelligence system that is equally transparent and effective is a quan-
dary in any democracy, because of two confl icting demands: secrecy (required by 
effectiveness) and transparency (required by democratic control, openness, and 
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a ccountability). Older democracies have had time, an arsenal of studies on intel-
ligence reform available, capable elected offi cials, and support and awareness on 
intelligence matters from outside, so as to be able to minimize the confl ict of 
transparency and effectiveness; and still they fail in one way or another. The 
United States’ egregious failures in intelligence coordination and cooperation 
prior to 9/11 are telling examples in this context. For emerging democracies, this 
is even more problematic, due not only to the inertia of intelligence communities 
toward change (which is common in all democracies), but also legacies of the old 
regimes, and lack of interest from or fear of involvement of the responsible elected 
civilians. 
 Yet, democratization of intelligence is not an impossible task for the developing 
democracies. Letting go of the past and transforming intelligence may have been a 
“Sisyphean” effort, to alienate a haunting past of secrecy and moral torture, as well as 
to transform people and mentalities, but in some countries it has resulted in a proper 
balance between secrecy and transparency. To ensure democratic consolidation, 
countries strived primarily to bring their intelligence agencies under control and 
ensure a level of transparency. Countries thus established new agencies, brought 
them under legal bases, set up executive, legislative, judicial and internal control and 
oversight mechanisms, and allowed vocal civil societies to develop and question the 
IC activities. Furthermore, in a few developing democracies, elected offi cials 
embarked upon a campaign for more assertive democratic control: better direction 
and oversight practices, improved public access to documents, and, frequent debates 
on national security and intelligence issues. More robust democratic control of the 
intelligence agencies has paved the way toward democratic consolidation as well as 
effective intelligence organizations, “serving under knowledgeable politicians who 
may not be able to quantify IC performance, but who will know a ‘job well or poorly 
done’ when they see it” ( Boraz and Bruneau  2006 , 28–42). In addition, as the new 
security challenges are more complex, reforming intelligence focuses increasingly on 
augmenting effectiveness. Improved standards for the recruitment and training of 
intelligence personnel, increased coordination and cooperation systems (including 
common fi ghting in the war on terrorism) have made intelligence agencies more 
effective. In Europe, reforming and democratizing intelligence had an additional 
effective boost: EU/NATO desire and the two organizations’ membership demands. 
 Other emerging democracies, however, failed to democratize their intelligence 
apparatuses, mostly because they fell short in consolidating their democracies, their 
responsible offi cials did not undertake robust intelligence reform, or because intel-
ligence apparatuses remained embedded within the military, eluding any form of 
civilian oversight and transparency. Reforming intelligence is a work in progress; 
therefore, hopefully, these countries will have effective and transparent intelligence 
agencies as well, in the foreseeable future. 
 Nevertheless, all in all, the developing democracies that successfully imple-
mented democratic reforms and control mechanisms for intelligence, have now 
more professional, trusted, and effective intelligence, which enjoy greater public 
support, and therefore do a better job in defending their countries and citizens. 
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